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All organizations confront the possibility of scandal; however, the 
reputational threat caused by scandal is exacerbated when these events 
are not properly addressed. Since scandals also have the potential to 
adversely affect organizational personnel, dilemmas arise regarding 
traditional ideas of employee agency. In this study, we conduct an 
experiment manipulating the severity of the reputational threat and its 
financial consequences for decision-makers, using actual corporate 
officers and internal auditors. One key question is this: “Are corporate 
decision-makers’ responses to potential scandals affected by whether 
they, as incentivized individuals (via stock options), have “skin in the 
game?” Findings indicate that corporate personnel believe corporations 
should respond aggressively to scandals having potential reputational 
consequences; however, they prefer not to proactively respond to 
reputational threats when expected personal gains are likely to be 
jeopardized. Internal auditors, by contrast, are less sensitive to 
personal gains. An archival supplementary analysis supports these 
findings by suggesting that equity compensation was 17.7% higher 
before a severe reputational event.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Business history includes a plethora of instances 
where an organization is confronted with a situation 
that threatens a severe reputational injury. Often 
business decision-makers make a potentially 
dangerous situation worse by failing to address the 
problem proactively and with the appropriate degree 
of transparency. The correct response may be 
difficult to formulate, in part because decision-
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makers do not possess all the information about 
what occurred. They cannot clearly foresee how 
stakeholders will react to such dynamic situations, 
and the correct responses can often only be seen in 
retrospect.  
Modern organizations are complex entities, and 
much of what needs to be done falls on relatively 
low-level actors (Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017). Specialized 
expertise or critical positioning necessitates the 
exercise of discretion. On some occasions, such 
judgments are not in the interests of the entire 
organization, especially as they attempt to navigate 
in harmony with the public interest. Lower-level 
agents also possess an idiosyncratic time horizon 
that favors actions featuring short-term advantages 
over those with the potential to work to the 
organization’s long-terms advantage (Shaikh, Drira, 
& Hassine, 2019). Intentionally, our material explores 
the factors and consequences of such idiosyncratic 
behavior.   
When questionable actions have been taken by 
and on behalf of an organization, higher-level 
officers possess a range of possible responses. 
These options vary in their capacity to correct the 
situation and its likely consequences; accordingly, 
the options present a set of potential costs to 
managers. Typically, more aggressive treatments will 
involve much more expense than options that 
implicitly suggest the problem is minor and unlikely 
to result in serious negative consequences. 
For many years, research literature has focused 
on the fact that executive compensation has been 
based on the notion of goal congruence: corporate 
officials are best motivated when they are 
compensated in alignment with corporate results 
(Eisenhartd, 1989). When key decision-makers stand 
to share in the good fortune of the company they 
manage, they are thought to maximize shareholder 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). However, these axiomatic 
assumptions may cloud how officials react to 
reputationally sensitive events. Choices that are 
costly in the short run may be less favored if their 
use has significantly negative personal wealth 
consequences for decision-makers. In other words, 
doing the right things may be more difficult when it 
cannot be done entirely with other people’s money.  
Because of the tremendous complexity involved 
in executive compensation and the mechanisms 
used to maximize investor wealth, this bias may 
negatively affect the efficacy of equity-based 
instruments. This is mainly because stock-based 
compensation creates controversy in the academic 
arena: for example, offering shares to executives 
promotes risk-sharing alongside shareholders and 
helps maximize overall organizational performance. 
This alleviates some agency problems (Eisenhardt, 
1989) and prevents over-focusing on short-term 
revenue growth. Also, executives are financially 
stimulated to maximize their own interest and, 
conversely, investors’ interest (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & 
Dalton, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Besides 
these two major benefits, a number of scholars have 
found that such compensation mechanisms yield 
other benefits, especially for executives working in 
capital markets (Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 
2003; Core & Larcker, 2002; Mehran, 1995; Yermack, 
1997). 
In contrast to all suggested benefits, scholars 
have also noted negative behavioral consequences 
associated with using equity-based compensation. 
Because of the compensation design, executives earn 
economic benefits when prices increase; however, 
they do not fully participate in losses when stock 
prices decrease below a given price threshold. Under 
these agreements, executives are inclined to take 
greater risks (with resulting extreme gains or losses) 
with the anticipation that their losses will be limited 
(Martin, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2019; Sanders, 
2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Another finding 
suggests that the risk of fraudulent behavior by 
executives to manipulate unhealthy earnings 
(Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006) may increase as the 
end of the stock-option period approaches 
(O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 2006).  
To address this controversy, the primary goal is 
to understand the reputational consequences of 
using equity-based compensation for executives 
responsible for the risk-decision process. This is 
achieved by extending the risk-taking behavioral 
models that arise as a consequence of aligning 
incentives using stock options (Connelly, Lee, 
Tihanyi, Certo, & Johnson, 2019; Martin, Wiseman, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2019; Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick, & 
Pollock, 2018). This research is primarily concerned 
with the impact of equity-based incentive 
compensation mechanisms on executives’ responses 
to scandals.  
The applied methodology consists of a realistic 
simulation based on a risk-bearing decision with 
potential reputational consequences. In addition to 
possible manipulation of the compensation received, 
research also focuses on the magnitude of the 
reputational threat facing the company. This is 
predicated on the belief that decision-makers are 
able to calibrate their actions to the demands of the 
events they face, and that there can indeed be a 
correlation between total compensation and event 
severity. 
Not all corporate decision-makers are equal. 
For these purposes, two groups can be 
distinguished. Most prominently, high-level 
executives with a great degree of control over 
corporate direction tend to be directly compensated 
for corporate performance, but have jobs not limited 
to risk management (Agle et al., 1999). In contrast to 
those individuals, internal auditors tend to be more 
focused on protecting the company, but are less 
likely to have performance-based compensation 
(Dezoort et al., 2000). By using both of these groups, 
the research assesses whether corporate position 
matters to the decision at hand. 
Anticipating the main conclusions to be drawn, 
the research findings indicate that the equity-based 
compensation covered in the agency theory 
literature may not work as expected in the effort to 
safeguard the reputation of companies. This is a 
consequence of executives’ mindset that expected 
economic goals should be achieved regardless of the 
reputational components in the decision-making 
process. To some extent, stock compensation 
operates well in aligning incentives to maximizing 
shareholders’ value, but its effects can be restricted 
in the reputational risk-bearing arena. 
 
Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review/ Volume 3, Issue 2, 2019 
 
56 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Creating a conceptual framework for understanding 
executive behavior is a complex task (Kole, 1997). To 
mitigate arguments about the behavioral factors 
involved, the theoretical background focuses on 
models of agent-principal conflicts as they pertain to 
incentives and behavioral decision-making processes 
which determine how organizations address risk and 
uncertainty. The agency theory explores the 
correlation between managers’ behavior and the 
interests of the institution, largely through the prism 
of organizational incentives. Specifically, this theory 
evaluates the consequences of incentives/objectives 
that are not identical or symmetrical (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a, 1983b). Essentially, the problem is that 
managers may not share the owners’ desire to 
maximize returns; therefore, systems must be 
established to control or monitor agent behavior. 
Once proper economic motivations are in place, 
behavioral decision-making models facilitate 
understanding how corporate personnel react in a 
prospective money-base environment. 
In the agency theoretical realm, stock-based 
compensation has been a common means of aligning 
agent incentives with those of shareholders (Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990). Through share ownership, often 
made available through stock option arrangements, 
executives participate in the wealth creation of 
corporate activities and bear similar risks in its 
production (Hall & Murphy, 2000; Liljeblom et al., 
2011). Unfortunately, agents with company stock are 
less able to diversify their portfolios and, therefore, 
are greatly affected by company stock price 
downturns for shares already held (French & 
Poterba, 1991; Goetzmann & Kuman, 2008). On the 
other hand, company executives suffer no actual 
wealth diminishment for stock price declines on 
stock options not yet exercised. Consequently, the 
instrument design imposes intrinsic contractual 
limitations on managerial personnel participating in 
the gains as investors.  
 Restrictions inherent in equity compensation 
intensify executives’ risk tolerance and, conversely, 
the extent to which their firms are exposed to risk. 
In agreements designed by the executives, risk 
exposure is accentuated (Conrad, 2015). This occurs 
largely because managerial decisions lean toward an 
“expected profit-protection attitude” intended to 
improve future stock performance (Shi, Connelly, 
Mackey, & Gupta, 2019).  
In terms of assuring prospective equity 
performance, executives manifest lower risk-
prevention attitudes. For example, share-price 
contracts discourage whistleblowing (Rose, Brink, & 
Norman, 2018). Expected profit-protection raises the 
level of certain risks, including reputational risk. 
Hence, shares-based mechanisms also encourage 
unanticipated risk scenarios involving agents who 
expect future gains.  
Companies exist in a world where many things 
could go wrong and cause them to suffer 
reputational losses. Most of these events have a low 
probability of occurrence; in addition, some can be 
readily mitigated by routine corrective action. 
Therefore, reputational threats do not always 
become reputational scandals. If systems are 
functioning well, threats are contained, allowing 
higher-level corporate officers to ignore the 
specifics. At other times, discrete involvement by 
higher-level agents becomes necessary. Decision-
makers’ attention can be required even if the 
outcome they select is to ignore the situation and to 
take no action at the present time. In this process, 
they have to deal with the unknown, and probably 
understated, cost of containment as well as the 
reaction of external parties. The objective is to 
prevent a scandal from developing since scandals 
involve ballooning costs and snowballing reactions 
by others.  
Aside from the profit-protective attitude, it is 
expected that reputational threats will be evaluated 
based on severity. There is a tendency to maintain 
business future stability as part of the expected 
managers’ capabilities (Shaikh et al., 2019). The 
preventive response should be based on risk 
categorization. People with experience with 
corporate risks should be expected to react with 
more forcefulness to threats that are more likely to 
happen, are more important to critical stakeholders 
and the media, and involve possible damage to 
important areas of ongoing business. This 
interaction expectation is captured by the following 
hypothesis. 
H1: Corporate personnel will support more 
proactive scandal responses when the company is 
confronted with more severe threat situations. 
H1 posits a “rational” reaction in which the 
response matches the stimulus in degree; however, 
other elements may enter into decision-making. 
Spending shareholder resources (perhaps 
extravagantly) in a conservative effort to minimize 
risk and avoid embarrassing scandals at all costs 
might be a viable strategy. However, such a posture 
might be tempered by its projected impact upon an 
individual’s personal wealth. Corporate officers with 
large holdings of company stock may realize that 
their personal wealth will be adversely affected by 
threat reactions that are inordinately expensive. 
When they realize that they are, at least in part, 
spending their own money, they may pursue less 
expensive strategies to deal with reputational 
threats. In doing so, they essentially exhibit greater 
willingness to take the risk that their response may 
not be adequate for the threat involved.  
H2: Corporate personnel will support less 
proactive scandal responses when confronted with 
potentially greater personal financial losses. 
If we believe that corporate officials take their 
professional duties very seriously, the inter-
relationship between H1 and H2 becomes apparent. 
The qualitative difference between severe 
organization-jeopardizing events and others may be 
so prominent that they alter how readily decision-
makers allow themselves to think about personal 
wealth consequences. With less at stake, a more 
balanced set of factors may come into play, allowing 
methods of compensation to be more salient.  
H3: When scandal threats faced by an 
organization are more severe, the degree of potential 
personal financial losses will be less consequential in 
determining the level of corporate response. 
Top executives are not the only participants 
engaged in the risk management process: internal 
auditors are effectively charged with protecting the 
organization, often from itself. These individuals are 
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less likely than top executives to have equity-based 
compensation, and are perhaps purposefully trained 
to be very conservative in their orientation toward 
risk. The relative amount of “skin in the game” can 
be seen as making it difficult to see the full 
magnitude of the potential threat. Having two 
groups in the mix of decision-makers enables 
empirical questioning based on differences in 
organizational position. This yields the following 
two-fold hypothesis. 
H4a: High-level corporate executives’ support 
for scandal decisions will be more influenced by 
potential personal financial losses than will internal 
auditors’ support for those decisions. 
H4b: Internal auditors’ support for scandal 
decisions will be more influenced by relative severity 
than will corporate executives’ support for those 
decisions. 
The scope of research into these phenomena is 
somewhat ambitious. Two factors can be 
manipulated, one of which is more obviously 
rational than the other. People should respond in 
proportion to the scale of threats if they are to do 
their best to protect their organizations. However, 
the personal financial consequences of doing so 
must be considered in the current regime of equity 
compensation for corporate personnel. How 
individuals balance these objectives may be related 
to their current organizational capacity. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
There is a central challenge embedded in studying 
individuals’ behavior as they weigh the risk of 
reputational events that have not yet occurred: 
conceptually modeling uniform settings that a 
certain person would perform given certain 
conditions. This study meets that challenge by 
explaining the research methodology and, in 
addition, the motivation and details behind 
simulating a reality-based problem that participants 
might face. Then, as necessitated by certain 
observed characteristics, there is a description of the 
administering process used to collect responses, 
followed by an analysis of the target group and the 
differentiating process. Lastly, a supplementary 
section in the research design, intended to enhance 
the quality of the findings, is explained. The 
objective of this addendum is to explain how the 
challenges of inquiring about individuals’ responses 
to a hypothetical problem are overcome.           
Completion of a successful study required 
thorough control over data regarding corporate 
practices and reputation-threatening events. 
Rigorous control over the great variety of corporate 
practices and threatening events was necessary to 
achieve. This precluded the use of a survey since the 
differing relevant environments of practice could 
never be sufficiently captured. An experimental 
approach was taken to achieve some degree of 
homogeneity and simplification, and as a way to 
reduce the sensitivity and confidentiality problems 
involved in making inquiries into actual situations 
(Ashton & Kramer, 1980; Gibbings & Salterio, 1996; 
Smith, 2014). Given the basic nature of the 
hypothesis involved, we believed that effective 
hypothetical manipulations could be designed and 
administered.  
Reputational threats from the revelation of 
scandalous facts can occur at any point during a 
product life cycle; however, the introduction of a 
new product seems to be a uniquely sensitive 
moment. Despite vigorous pre-testing of new 
products before their launch, the release of 
something new into the market can be seen as a 
much broader challenge for product functionality 
and safety; therefore, concerns about new products 
form a large part of the reputational risk faced by a 
company. This sensitivity is especially pronounced 
in the pharmaceutical industry because new drugs 
can sometimes produce unpredictable reactions 
(Allen, 1984). In this industry, the inadvertent harm 
done can be enormous in magnitude, and simple 
recalls of the product are not always very effective. 
Pharmaceuticals are heavily regulated in most 
countries, but the burden imposed by such 
regulation varies by country (Chen, 2015). 
Subjects were given a hypothetical scenario 
involving a hair-growing pill intended to remedy 
male pattern baldness. Reports of unpleasant side 
effects were made following the initial sales of the 
drug in a regulatory market that is more flexible 
than in the United States. Subjects were asked for 
their reaction to a Board of Directors’ 
recommendation that one of three levels of action 
(total recall, partial recall, no recall) be implemented. 
The health repercussions of the news served as the 
first manipulated variable. Two levels of severity 
involving the qualitative degree of unpleasantness 
and the likelihood of occurrence were applied. The 
high-severity case involved a combination of 
reduced sexual performance, nausea, headaches, and 
somnolence for one of every six users. The low-
severity case involved poor drug effectiveness in one 
of twenty cases.  
Participants were asked to indicate a level of 
support for a decision, rather than to make a 
decision, in deference to the observation that 
responses to reputational threats are typically group 
decisions made at the highest level of corporate 
governance. In other words, supporting the decision 
of someone with more responsibility and power 
within the company is closer to the actual 
involvement of the participants. This design features 
also reduces the degree to which the decision might 
be influenced by espoused ethics or social 
desirability. 
Because subjects were hypothetically vested 
with wealth positions constituting a large and 
growing block of company stock, the expected 
decline in value of the corporate stock was designed 
as an index to that sensitivity to the potential for 
personal financial loss. Decreases in stock price of 
22.5%, 7.5%, and 0% were used to distinguish levels 
of financial loss that would accompany a total recall 
of the product, a partial recall, or no recall 
respectively. The manipulations of threat severity 
and expected economic consequences were meant to 
provide data to test H1 – H3. 
The test of H4 is accommodated by the nature 
of the respondents. Approximately half the 
respondents were “C-suite” corporate executives; the 
other half were internal auditors. This made a 
formal consideration of occupational group 
differences possible: corporate positions had not 
been assigned to participants, but instead were 
stated as attributes they possessed, so it need not be 
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considered part of the experimental design. Since 
the distinction involved in H4 is a partition, the cell 
array should be considered a 2x3 composed of 
threat severity (within-subjects) and personal 
economic loss potential (between-subjects). 
Manipulation checks established that subjects 
understood the undesirability of the early product 
performance results on human health, and of the 
lack of desired effectiveness results attributed to the 
product. They also understood the relative financial 
costs of the three choices available to the board of 
directors. 
Subjects were recruited for the experiments by 
one of the authors, aided by contacts made for a 
previous project involving “C-Suite” executives by 
that author. Internal auditor participation was 
facilitated by an endorsement by the Institute of 
Internal Auditors. We sought a sample as equally 
divided across the two groups as possible. Obtaining 
subjects whose work positions did involve responses 
to reputational threats was typical was critical to the 
research (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014). 
The instrument was delivered through the 
internet using Qualtrics to control the order of cues 
seen by the subjects. Each subject saw two scenarios 
involving both the low- and the high-severity 
situations. For both, subjects were asked to assume 
their current capacity by for a hypothetical 
pharmaceutical company with a new hair loss 
product. Subjects were hypothetically vested with a 
compensation package that included stock options 
with significant past gains. 
Supplementary analysis enriches the research 
methodology. The central hypothesis refers to the 
managerial reaction to uncertainty facing unknown 
reputational consequences and potential personal 
losses. To validate the findings, an additional 
segment tests archival data from known events and 
the differences with a peer group without such data. 
The collected data contains archives relative to the 
recall of 164 Class I life-threatening drugs from 
2012 to 2017 by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). This is because life-threatening products have 
high media coverage and negative financial impact 
over organizations (Chen, Ganesan, & Liu, 2009; 
Baucus & Baucus, 2009). From this sample group, we 
gathered the pre-event stock option CEOs’ 
compensations. Once the gathering process was 
completed, a similarly sized sample of peer 
companies (164 cases) compares the executives’ 
compensations of both groups. The comparison is 
run using a non-parametric ANOVA test. The overall 
intention pursues not only instrument validity but 
also the robustness of the theoretical hypothesis. 
Stock options compensation was obtained from 
Compustat Execucomp. Consequently, recalling-
firms represent the high-risk scenario, the control 
group, the low reputational risk, and the 
compensation, the economic component.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The 180 participants were composed of 71 females 
(39%) and 109 males (61%). The average experience 
of members of the group was more than 16 years of 
work, and over 62% of the participants held a 
professional certification. An equal number of 
participants (90) were in the high-level corporate 
executive group and in the internal audit group. The 
internal auditors were more heavily female than the 
executives (46% compared to 33%), but were almost 
as experienced (15 years versus 17 years). As 
expected the executive were less likely to be 
credentialed (36% compared to 89%). 
Overall, the respondents supported (agreed or 
strongly agreed on a five-point Likert scale) with the 
decision made by the Board of Directors in 46% of 
the instances. This varies from 47% regarding the 
more severe reputational threat case to 44% in the 
less extreme scenario. The executives tended to 
agree less often than the internal auditors in both 
the extreme (38% compared to 57%) and the less 
extreme instances (33% compared to 54%). For both 
scenarios, agreement was more common than strong 
disagreement, but there were no significant 
differences across these two response categories for 
either participant group. Along similar lines, strong 
disagreement was relatively rare, reaching a high of 
17% for the executive group in the less extreme case. 
H1 studied the main effect of severity. We 
anticipated that the respondents as a group would 
more likely fall into line with the board of directors’ 
decision regarding the scenario that presented a 
greater reputational threat. Table 1 details the 
results of this main effect. Means of 2.93 for the 
first scenario (involving serious problems) and 3.00 
for the second (involving less serious ones) were 
produced. These were not significantly different at 
the p<.05 level; thus, no support existed for H1. 
 
 
Table 1. Corporate personnel responses to the severity of the reputational threat (low – high) 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean SD N 
  Severity – Low 2.30 1.398 164 
  Severity – High 1.93 1.364 146 
  Panel B. Homogeneity 
  Levene’s  F 
   Based on Mean 0.076 0.783 
   Based on Median 0.038 0.843 
   Panel C. Main effects 
  df MS F P-value η
p
2 
Intercept 1 1584.2 830.3 <.001 0.823 
Severity – H1 (Low – High) 1 0.2 0.105 0.746 0.001 
Error 178 1.908 
   Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05 
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Table 2 involved the impact of personal 
financial losses due to the fall in stock value 
precipitated by a recall action. H2 expected that the 
severity of such losses would be inversely correlated 
with the magnitude of support for an extreme 
corporate reaction (that also would be the most 
expensive option available). The results confirm 
support for the expected effect. Participants tend to 
lessen their support for the board of directors’ 
position when they have information about a large 
reduction of stock value as a result. The difference 
in means is significant at p<.05. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Corporate personnel responses’ main effects: personal economic losses 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean SD N 
  Economic Losses of 22.5% 2.27 1.287 60 
  Economic Losses of 7.5% 3.43 1.125 60 
  Economic Losses of 0% 3.20 1.436 60 
  Panel B. Homogeneity 
  Levene’s  F (2/177) 
   Based on Mean 3.435 <.05 
   Based on Median 2.742 0.067 
   Panel C. Main effects 
  df MS F p-value η
p
2 
Intercept 1 1584.2 953.5 <.001 0.843 
Economic Losses – H2 2 22.9 13.8 <.001 0.135 
Error 177 1.661 
   Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05 
 
H3 is an interaction involving the two main 
effects of the first two hypotheses. Here the 
expectation is that the severity of the event will 
change the impact of the financial loss on support 
for the board’s decision. Table 3 details the tests of 
this expectation. 
 
 
Table 3. Main interaction effects of executives’ responses 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
Severity – Low Severity – High Total 
  Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Economic Losses – 22.5% 2.23 1.305 30 2.30 1.291 30 2.27 1.287 60 
Economic Losses – 7.5% 2.67 0.884 30 4.20 0.761 30 3.43 1.125 60 
Economic Losses – No 4.10 1.242 30 2.30 0.988 30 3.20 1.436 60 
Total 3.00 1.398 90 2.93 1.364 90 2.97 1.378 180 
Panel B. Homogeneity 
  Levene’s  F (5/174) 
       Based on Mean 2.315 <.05 
       Based on Median 1.215 0.287 
       Panel C. Main interaction effects 
  df MS F p-value η
p
2 
    Intercept 1 1584.2 1312 <.001 0.883 
    Economic Losses 2 22.9 18.9 <.001 0.179 
    Severity (Low – High) 1 0.200 0.1656 0.685 0.001 
    Economic Losses x Severity – H3 2 41.9 34.668 <.001 0.285 
    Error 174 1.2 
       Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05 
 
As anticipated by our interaction hypothesis, 
the relative severity of the corporate scandal creates 
a different environment for assessing the impact of 
personal financial losses incurred by participants. 
When severity is high, participants are less willing to 
accept personal losses (M = 2.3, SD = 1.291), even if 
this means questioning the board’s 
recommendations. This effect is significant at the 
p<.05 level and provides support for H3. Along 
similar lines, one can say that lower severity allows 
participants the opportunity to bear their financial 
losses when given the opportunity to support or 
question the board. 
The final hypotheses pertain to group 
differences in sensitivity to the two manipulations. 
We expected that corporate executives would be 
more influenced by their potential financial losses  
 
 
and less by the severity of the scandal. On the other 
side of the same coin, we expected that auditors 
would be less influenced by personal financial 
losses, and would respond more strongly to the 
severity of the situation. The results show that 
occupational group differences are quite salient in 
the economic perspective. As summarized in Table 
4, internal auditors much more readily agree to a full 
and costly product recall (M = 4.28, SD = 0.976) than 
did the executives (M = 2.27, SD = 1.287). Less 
extreme actions recommended by the board did not 
exhibit such sharp group disagreement. This first 
difference (significant at p<.01) supports H4a. 
Instead, threat severity was roughly equivalently 
evaluated as important by both groups (p>.05); thus, 
H4b is not supported.  
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Table 4. Between corporate roles: responses’ main effects 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
Executives Internal auditors Total 
  Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Economic Losses – 22.5% 2.27 1.287 60 4.28 0.976 60 3.28 1.523 120 
Economic Losses – 7.5% 3.43 1.125 60 3.43 1.212 60 3.43 1.165 120 
Economic Losses – No 3.20 1.436 60 2.67 1.548 60 2.93 1.510 120 
Total 2.97 1.378 180 3.46 1.424 180 3.21 1.421 360 
Severity – Low 3.00 1.398 90 3.59 1.253 90 3.29 1.357 180 
Severity – High 2.93 1.364 90 3.33 1.572 90 3.13 1.481 180 
Total 2.97 1.378 180 3.46 1.424 180 3.21 1.421 360 
Panel B. Main interaction effects – Economic losses 
  df MS F p-value η
p
2 
    Intercept 1 3718.5 2276.2 <.001 0.865 
    Role (Executives – Internal auditors) 1 22.0 13.5 <.001 0.037 
    Economic Losses 2 7.8 4.8 <.01 0.026 
    Roles x Economic Losses – H4a 2 54.3 33.2 <.001 0.158 
    Error 354 1.2 
       Panel C. Main interaction effects – Severity (Low – High) 
  df MS F p-value η
p
2 
    Intercept 1 3718.5 1892.8 <.001 0.842 
    Role (Executives – Internal auditors)  1 22.0 11.2 <.001 0.031 
    Severity (Low – High) 1 2.3 1.2 0.276 0.003 
    Roles x Severity (Low – High) – H4b 1 0.8 0.4 0.523 0.001 
    Error 356 2.0 
       Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05 
As stated in the methodology, a supplementary 
analysis enriches the quality of the findings. Because 
the experimental instrument simulates a reality-
based scenario, we test the reliability of the 
instrument and the findings using feasible data from 
FDA archives and the executives’ compensation. 
Using an ANOVA test, findings suggest that on 
average executives whose companies recall their 
products end up with 17.7% higher values in their 
stock option compensation before the event (p<.05). 
The mean of executives’ compensation before the 
scandal rose to 2.3 million dollars (SD = .8), while in 
the control group the mean ascended to $1.9 million 
on average. Therefore, this information enriches the 
consistency hypothesis: executives who have higher 
compensation engage in more risk-taking behaviors 
which could potentially lead to negative reputational 
events. Table 5 details these findings. 
 
 
Table 5. Executives’ compensations before recall vs. no recall 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean SD N   
Recall 3.00 1.398 90   
No Recall 2.93 1.364 90   
Panel B. Homogeneity 
  Levene’s  F 
 
  
Based on Mean 23.2 <.001 
 
  
Based on Median 13.9 <.001 
 
  
Panel C. Main effects 
  df MS F P-value η
p
2 
Intercept 1 11229 79.8 <.001 .206 
Recall 1 2474 17.6 <.001 .054 
 308 14062    
Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05      
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The findings provide valuable information regarding 
managerial responses to plausible business 
problems involving companies’ reputations, and 
these findings are grounded in theoretical 
paradigms. In particular, the research addresses the 
unexpected consequences which become possible 
when equity-based compensation agreements 
influence risk-management decisions. Only when 
expected personal losses are low (or absent), the 
severity of the threat resulted consequential in the 
preventing efforts. Furthermore, results indicate that  
such behavior could be attributed to the person’s 
professional role (when an internal auditor faced a  
 
similar event, financial personal losses were 
irrelevant). It can be inferred that, when the main 
agents’ driver is the protection of personal profits, 
the likelihood of reputational scandals increases, 
compromising the expected “skin in the game” 
aspect. As a theoretical inquiry into the factors that 
promote major reputational events, the research 
contributes to the academic literature regarding the 
inherent limitations (such as executives’ capital loss 
exclusions) observed as a result of equity-based 
contracts. The researchers theorized that managerial 
responses contain an idiosyncratic element 
(expected financial gains) likely to increase the 
potential damage of reputational scandals (ceateris 
paribus). This last element enriches the body of 
literature suggesting that equity compensation 
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packages may increase firms’ risk exposure because 
of the executives’ behavioral implications (Martin et 
al., 2019; Shaikh et al., 2019; Shi et al., 2019).   
Agency theory, lightly touched upon by this 
paper, suggests that reputational threats made 
known to management can be mitigated by aligning 
the personal interests of executives with the 
organizations. Usually, goal alignment, the “skin in 
the game” mentioned earlier, involves ensuring 
agent motivation for the pursuit of opportunity. This 
paper’s premise is that this should also be expected 
to properly create goal congruence in risk 
management. Our findings, created by stipulating 
the existence of interests involving equity-based 
compensation packages, do not suggest that agency 
theory works as expected. Agents, looking at the 
prospects of an expensive corporate response that 
will impose personal equity losses, favor less 
extreme reactions.  
Executives mitigate the likelihood of scandal 
incidents with corrective actions when the severity 
of the threat is high but the likely harm is 
inexpensive. When the threat severity is high but 
personally “affordable,” proper corrective measures 
are accepted. In these instances, gains are earned by 
corporate actors by falling into line with actions that 
respond to the threat. These gains can be thought of 
as shared with investors, whose best interests are 
served when a forceful response is made. When the 
opposite factors coexist, when preventive costs 
exceed personal expected gains, our research 
interests are heightened. To some extent, executives 
prefer the uncertainty of not adequately attending to 
the threat, raising the prospect of an actual scandal. 
In fact, the decision cost does not jeopardize the 
executives’ incentives, and both investors and 
executives seek and earn profits by not responding 
more forcefully to reputational threats. The side 
effect of not attending to the expensive threat is to 
increase the organization’s reputational uncertainty. 
Outside investors are likely unaware that current 
profits contain a reputational uncertainty 
component promoted by the incentives mechanism 
put into place for key agents. 
The study evidence also suggests that there is 
quite a bit of difference between agreement in the 
abstract and agreement when personal 
consequences are involved. We show that when the 
stakes are unclear, or when losses are not 
quantified, all risks are taken seriously. Stock-option 
compensation can be a key element in predicting 
corporate responses prior to the scandal’s 
occurrence. When executives’ expected personal 
losses and their personal wealth are compromised, 
they prefer the scenario which is less costly to the 
individuals. This implies that the reputational risk-
bearing behavior is consistent with the overall 
business risk attitude under the equity-based 
compensation environment (Hoskisson et al., 2017).  
We also theorized that the amount of expected 
personal losses will trigger a behavioral reaction that 
mitigates the likelihood of reputational events. 
However, the above-mentioned findings indicate that 
internal auditors are much less sensitive to expected 
personal losses. The behavior of those individuals 
manifested an extremely conservative orientation. 
Such behavior sought to inhibit the occurrence of 
scandals with the aid of the strongest corporate 
response. To say that internal auditors are more 
ethical might be an overreaching conclusion, yet it 
might be accepted by those who are not highly risk-
averse. Thus, internal auditors serve as monitors 
who potentially compensate for some of the 
uncertainty facing corporations in the form of 
reputational scandals. 
One could say that this study fails to indicate a 
departure from a singular correct strategy. The 
essence of reputational threats is that decision-
makers lack enough information to guide them 
precisely to a reaction bold enough to suggest 
concern and accepted responsibility, yet not 
inordinately costly. Circumstances could develop 
such that the crisis “blows over” on its own accord, 
or through the emergence of countervailing facts. 
Less debatable is the fact that, by taking the least 
expensive decision, the levels of reputational 
uncertainty increase. Less proactivity translates into 
leaving more to chance, and hope being substituted 
for control. Uncertainty is disliked by markets and, 
even if things are not as bad as they could be, this 
illustrates a serious misalignment between the 
interests of executives and shareholders. 
Two major theoretical approaches, behavioral 
agency theory, and reputational risk management 
collide in the research underscoring the need for 
further investigation. The concept that agents who 
deal with reputational threats to their institutions 
may have conflicts of interest, which potentially 
interfere with corrective actions in the best interests 
of those institutions, opens a plethora of 
investigative opportunities. One suitable research 
question is this: “What is the optimal level of 
reputational risk that promotes a healthy 
environment without compromising growth?” Here 
is another: “Is equity-based compensation the 
modest alternative to aligning executives’ and 
investors’ incentives to mitigate reputational 
exposure, or there are better instruments?” Such 
questions could be pursued as an extension of our 
contribution.        
Aside from the restrictions mentioned in the 
manuscript, this paper acknowledges the limitations 
that exist in experimental research. We ask people to 
respond to a hypothetical set of facts, and we are 
forced to believe that people take the events we 
describe seriously. Our manipulation checks 
determined that people understood the situation 
presented to them, but that is a relative matter: 
people could have misunderstood certain aspects as 
well. This paper has a major advantage in that it 
accesses people whose work roles match the ones 
that we ask them to assume in the study. We also 
know that there have been many scandals, many of 
them in the industry we use in our hypothetical 
scenarios. 
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APPENDIX  
 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
 
The pharmaceutical company PharmaWorld Inc. (PHA), No. 9 in the world (about the same size as 
Bristol-Myers), is one of the oldest and largest organizations in the world. PHA’s latest development is a male 
hair-growing drug without any negative side effects. The drug tests passed the initial clinical trials and are 
ready for distribution. The drug requires a special permit to be launched in the market. The U.S. Surgeon 
General has not yet granted approval. In the past, 95% of the times drugs were approved, occasional further 
testing was required.  
In order to generate early revenue to partially offset the huge R&D investment costs while waiting for 
the last approval, the drug was pre-launched six months ago in South America, the company’s third-largest 
market region, where such approval is not required. Product sales and purchase orders are exponentially 
growing.  
Your ROLE in this exercise is (CEO/Chief Executive Auditor) of the organization. Your compensation, 
like other PHA’s employees, includes salary, stock options, and other employee benefits. Since last year, your 
stock options have increased by 20%. 
During a recent quality control test of the product, the regional operations manager has reported that a 
product run did not meet appropriate quality specifications. A key chemical component from one of the 
main Asian suppliers proved defective. The manager estimated that two-thirds of the shipment to South 
America, now on the market, is defective. 
On a pre-examination, the health-risk department concluded that the defective batch may pose the 
following SEVERE REPUTATIONAL THREAT: decreased sexual performance, nausea, headaches, somnolence, 
and reduced drug effectiveness for one out of six (low-severity) to 20 (high-severity) patients. 
Coincidentally, at the time of this discovery and subsequent analysis of effects, the Board of Directors 
was holding a meeting. Out of the available options, ranging all the ways up to a total regional product recall, 
the course of action selected was a defective shipment batch recall with no product recall until further 
examination. The Board viewed the options as ranging from a total recall to a defective batch recall to no 
recall at all. The market risk division estimated that such actions would cause the following financial losses 
respectively: 22.5%, 7.9%, and 0.0% decrease in PHA’s stock prices. 
For each of the four statements below, select a response from 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = 
disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree. 
 As (CEO/CEA) of the organization, I agree with the Board of Directors’ suggestion.  
 Hair loss represents a major concern among males. 
 Side effects of drugs are a primary determinant of consumers’ preferences. 
 Variations in stock prices reflect companies’ financial performance. 
 
